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Changing Times, Changing Crimes:
The Criminal's Newest Weapon and
the U.S.'s Response
George J. Moscarino and Michael R.
Shumaker*
I. Introduction
Every evening's newscast is replete with thefts that are
committed with a gun, knife or other lethal weapon. Rarely does
the lead news story address the criminal's newest, and perhaps most
effective theft weapon: the computer. Granted, a criminal's use of
a computer does not strike fear in our hearts the same way a
sawed-off shotgun might, but the real monetary damage that can be
inflicted by these machines far exceeds any take a criminal could
obtain by the use of a shotgun. For example, only recently, a
group of Russian computer hackers stole $10 million from Citibank
by invading its allegedly secure computer network.1
Computer theft offers distinct advantages to the cybercriminal.
It allows the criminal to pilfer large amounts of money without
having to face locked safes, foreign premises, or, most importantly,
armed security guards. A heist can be done safely and efficiently
through a few strokes on a computer keyboard. Moreover, while
a gun offers a thief protection and control over his victims, a
computer eliminates this need and supplements the thief's arsenal
with anonymity and an unlimited range of victims. As one
commentator accurately stated, "If I want to steal money, a
* George J. Moscarino is a Cleveland partner and trial attorney for the
international law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. He is a senior member and
former Chairman of the Corporate Criminal Investigations Section of the Firm's
Litigation Group, a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, and a
former Assistant Attorney General and Assistant County Prosecutor, Ohio.
Michael R. Shumaker is an associate in the Litigation Section of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue's Litigation Group in Washington, D.C.
1. Russians Arrest 6 in Computer Thefts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at D5.
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computer is a much better tool than a handgun .... It would take
me a long time to get $10 million with a handgun."2
As the Citibank heist3 illustrates, a cybercriminal's reach is
international and his crimes can often be committed without
anyone knowing when it was done, how it was done, or who the
culprit was. It is for these and other reasons that theft and fraud
offenses committed with the aid of computers and other electronic
media will soon become leading international crimes. There are no
visa or passport requirements, no security checkpoints, and no
physical barriers.' Perhaps most importantly, such crimes require
little manpower and resources.5
Although the Citibank heist involved the stealing of U.S.
currency, the modern day criminal is now focusing his computer's
attention on stealing something that is oftentimes more valuable:
the corporate trade secret. The cybercrook has realized that
stealing the next version of the Coca Cola recipe or Windows
software is worth more than a $10 million heist., Perhaps more
importantly, the trade secret-unlike the $10 million in cash-can
be duplicated and downloaded without the true owner ever
knowing that the trade secret has been stolen. The owner still has
a copy; unfortunately, the cybercrook does too.
To combat this ever-increasing problem, President Clinton
recently signed into law the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
(EEA).6 The law serves a dual purpose: 1) it provides a criminal
cause of action against trade secret theft; and 2) it prohibits foreign
state-sponsored industrial espionage.7 Most importantly for the
purposes of this article, the EEA explicitly criminalizes the theft of
trade secrets through the use of computers and the Internet, a
method of misappropriation that fell outside the coverage of pre-
existing U.S. laws.'
2. Jon Swartz, Modem Thieves Prefer Computers to Guns! Online Crime Is
Seldom Reported, Hard to Detect, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 1997, at Al (statement
of Daniel Geer, director of engineering for Open Market in Cambridge,
Massachusetts).
3. See Russians Arrest 6, supra note 1.
4. M.E. Bowman, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can
International Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic Stability? Is Interna-
tional Law Ready for the Information Age? 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1935, 1943
(1996).
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996).
7. Id. at 1831-1832.
8. Id. The EEA was heavily supported by the U.S. Department of Justice
and the FBI, who jointly drafted the first version of the EEA for Congress' consid-
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This article will discuss the enormity of the trade secret theft
problem, the reasons for its recent explosion, and the role of
computers and electronic espionage in that explosion. It will then
discuss the EEA, including its individual, provisions, and its
ramifications for the international legal community.
II. The Computer and Its Use in Trade Secret
A. The Problem
Trade secret theft, or economic espionage as it is often called,
commonly occurs in one of two ways: 1) a disgruntled employee
misappropriates the company's trade secrets for his own financial
benefit or to harm his ex-employer; or 2) a competitor of the
company or a foreign nation misappropriates the trade secret in
order to advance the competitor's or foreign nation's financial
interests.9 The manner in which these thefts occur ranges from the
complex (computer hacking, wire interception, spy devices) to the
mundane (memorization, theft of documents, photocopying). But
in all instances, the owner-who often has invested hours of hard
work and millions of dollars in developing the trade secret-is
deprived of the commercial advantage he would have obtained by
keeping the trade secret unavailable to his competitors and the
public.
The statistics on trade secret theft are startling. One survey
estimated that U.S. businesses currently lose $24 billion a year to
trade secret theft,1° and that this could potentially rise to $63
billion a year." A 1994 study estimated the cost as high as $100
billion annually.12  A 1996 survey of Fortune 1000 firms by
WarRoom Research found that 58' percent reported computer
break-ins during the previous twelve months, and 18 percent
suffered losses exceeding $1 million. 3 As early as 1988, 48
eration. Counterintelligence Executive Notes 13-96 (visited 31 October 1996)
<http://www.nacic.gov>; see H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 6 (1996) (inapplicability of
federal criminal laws) [hereinafter "House Rep."].
9. See House Rep., supra note 8, at 6.
10. Counterintelligence Executive Notes 13-96, supra note 8 (the 1996 survey
was conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security).
11. House Rep., supra note 8, at 6.
12. 142 Cong. Rec. S377, at S377 (Jan. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
13. See News Release by WarRoom Research L.L.C. (visited Nov. 21, 1996)
<http://www.isecure.com>, at 2 [hereinafter "WarRoom Research"].
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percent of 150 research and development companies surveyed by
the National Institute of Justice reported that they had been victims
of trade secret theft.14 Finally, the president of Lockheed Martin
Corporation informed the United States Congress that a recent
survey of international aerospace companies revealed that 100
percent of them believed that a competitor, either domestic or
international, had used intelligence techniques against them in an
effort to obtain trade secrets. 5
Whether these figures are accurate or merely the prognostica-
tions of doomsayers,16 one thing is clear: trade secret theft is on
the rise. In 1995, the American Society for Industrial Security
(ASIS) found that of the 325 companies surveyed, almost half
experienced trade secret theft of some sort during the previous two
years-an increase of 323 percent from a survey conducted four
years earlier.17 Just prior to the EEA's enactment, Louis Freeh,
then Director of the FBI, informed Congress that from 1995 to
1996, the number of economic espionage cases the FBI was
investigating doubled from 400 to 800.18 Similarly, the Computer
Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon University received
132 reports of unauthorized computer access in 1989; in 1995 it
received 2412."9
B. Why the Explosion in Trade Secret Theft?
1. The Relative Ease of the Theft.-No one reason can be
given for the increase in theft. There are many contributing factors
and the most notable are discussed below. However, the single
14. Id.; see also William J. Cook, Industrial Espionage and the Internet, CHI.
LAW., Feb. 1997, at 57.
15. 142 Cong. Rec. S12201-03, at S12212 (Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kohl).
16. One commentator believes the EEA is an overreaction to contrived statis-
tics, and is really designed to employ a largely obsolete intelligence force. Robert
Dreyfuss, Tinker Taylor, Silicon Spy, CAL.: LAW., May 1996, at 37; Robert
Dreyfuss, Spy vs. No-spy: The New Espionage Scare, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 23,
1996, at 9.
17. 142 Cong. Rec. S12201-03, at S12212 (Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kohl).
18. S. Rep. No. 104-359, available in 1996 WL 497065, at 20 (1996) [hereinafter
"Senate Rep."].
19. Susan E. Davis, Gangster Tech, CAL. LAW., June 1996, at 42, 44.
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greatest reason for the dramatic increase is undoubtedly the world's
ever-expanding use of the computer.
Increasing public use and access to computers has allowed
people who harbor criminal intentions to copy sensitive information
or to enter confidential areas to which they previously had no
access. For example, a disgruntled employee who wants to take the
company's most attractive new plan or product to his next
employer no longer needs to spend hours clandestinely duplicating
documents. He can now download the plans, schematics or
documents to a three and a half inch computer disk-a perfect size
for his front shirt pocket-in a matter of seconds.2"
The increase in computer networking and Internet connections
also has played a significant part in the growth of trade secret theft.
Every time a new computer is linked to a network, or a company
network is linked to the Internet, the points of entry through which
a hacker may gain access to a company's confidential system are
increased. Each new addition increases the chance that someone
will not follow the proper security instructions or allow access to an
unauthorized user.2'
To illustrate, suppose you have two houses: one with two
doors, and one with ten. It is considerably harder to remember to
lock all ten doors at the end of the day than it is to lock up just
two. Much the same can be said for the number of connections a
computer network has to the outside computer community.
This development has allowed some of the formerly annoying,
but relatively harmless computer hackers to become accomplished
international criminals. Unethical competitors and some foreign
20. A 3.5 inch computer disk can store approximately 720 pages of double-
spaced type. Peter J. Toren, Internet: A Safe Haven for Anonymous Information
Thieves?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 647, 648 n.5 (1996). As one
commentator summarized the problem:
An employee can download trade secret information from a company's
computer to a diskette, transfer the information to the hard drive of a
home computer and then upload it to the Internet, where it can be
transmitted worldwide within minutes .. . Within days, a U.S. company
can lose complete control over its trade secrets forever.
R. Mark Halligan, Intellectual Property, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at B6; see also
Senate Rep., supra note 18, at 18.
21. Davis, supra note 19, at 44; Richard Behar, Who's Reading Your E-mail?,
FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, at 56, 58 (".. . every technology manager knows: The
more the computers of the business world become interconnected-via the
Internet and private networks-the more exposed they are to break-ins.").
1998]
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nations now employ these hackers to take advantage of the chinks
in certain companies' computer armor. Consequently, it is no
longer necessary to trespass on corporate turf to steal a competi-
tor's confidential information.23
This fact is further exacerbated by the ease with which these
hackers can break into the systems. Although companies routinely
respond to these threats with ever-increasing computer security
measures, the hackers have developed an impressive array of
techniques that singularly or in tandem allow for a stunningly high
degree of success. The names given these techniques sound like
something out of a James Bond movie. They include: spoofing,
24
sniffing,25 social engineering,26 demon dialing,27 dumpster div-
ing,28
22. See Behar, supra note 21, at 58.
23. Behar, supra note 21, at 58.
24. "IP Spoofing" is a technique in which the hacker convinces one computer
on a network that his computer is friendly and authorized to enter the system.
This is done by manipulating the internet protocol ("IP") address-the digital
information that the host computer reads to determine access-on the requesting
computer. See generally Lou Dolinar, Spoofing Lets Hackers Hijack Computers,
Officials Warn, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan. 24, 1995, at B5; Jeffrey Young,
Spies Like Us, FORBES, June 3, 1996, at 70, available in 1996 WL 15115548, at 15
("spoofing").
25. "Sniffing" involves the use of certain computer network monitoring tools
to eavesdrop on the electronic messages traversing a computer network. By doing
so, the hacker can learn a variety of information (depending on the system's
security) such as the IP addresses the network is accepting. As one commentator
put it, the electronic messages are like postcards and the sniffer merely reads them
for the hacker searching for clues to entry. Vicki Tardif, Sniffers and Spoofers,
Internet World (visited December 1995) <http://www.internetworld.om>; Behar,
supra note 21, at 66.
26. "Social engineering" is "hacker-speak for tricking workers into offering
information that will help during break-ins." Behar, supra note 21, at 66. It is still
the most common method used to gain access to a secure computer system. Davis,
supra note 19, at 44.
27. "Demon" or "war dialing" involves sequential dialing of telephone
numbers within a set range to determine which phone lines are hooked up to
active computer modems. By going directly to the individual computers, hackers
avoid the security system set up by the company to filter Internet traffic (often
termed a "firewall"). Once identified, the hacker focuses on those computers for
possible infiltration. Behar, supra note 21, at 59; Winn Schwartau, Hackers,
Sniffers, Worms and Demons, INFORMATION WEEK, May 16, 1994, at 39, available
in 1994 WL 3323412, at 12.
28. "Dumpster diving" occurs when a hacker sifts through a company's
dumpster at night to find valuable information that may assist in future hacking
efforts. Swartz, supra note 2.
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and pinging.29
One of the most exotic tools used by the hacker is the so-
called Van Eck device, which is named after the Dutch scientist
who invented it.3" This device allows anyone to pick up emissions
from a computer screen from as far as two kilometers away.31
This device was reportedly used to capture CIA double-agent
Aldrich Ames.32
The fact that the computer equipment needed to implement
these techniques costs relatively very little adds further fuel to the
fire. As one commentator opined, computer crime has exploded
because the "tools have gotten so good and so cheap."33 To make
matters worse, these hacker techniques, and the software needed
to implement them, are often available for free on the Internet.
34
2. The Extremely Profitable Nature of the Theft.-The
relative ease with which a trade secret can be stolen using a
computer is perhaps exceeded only by the size of the windfall that
can be obtained. Once inside a secure computer system, what or
how much a person takes is often entirely up to them. "Now taking
$100 million dollars is no harder than taking ten dollars. It just
depends on where the decimal point is."35
Trade secrets, however, are often more valuable than U.S.
currency. In one case, computer hackers breached the internal
network of Interactive Television Technologies, the creators of a
device that lets consumers access the Internet using their television
set. Once in, the hackers then stole trade secrets worth $250
million.3 6 Interactive Television Technologies is now out of
business. 37
Similarly, computer hackers broke into a U.S. automobile
manufacturer's secure computer network during the summer of
29. "Pinging" uses a software program to send an electronic signal to every
computer address for a given company to determine whether the computer is up
and alive. Obviously, the alive computers are then targeted for infiltration.
Behar, supra note 21, at 59.
30. Id. at 70.
31. Id. A high quality Van Eck device can be purchased for US $4,000. Id.
32. Id. at 66.
33. Davis, supra note 19, at 44.
34. Behar, supra note 21, at 66; Davis, supra note 19, at 44.
35. Davis, supra note 19, at 60.
36. Swartz, supra note 2, at Al.
37. Id.
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1991, and stole confidential designs for future cars.38 These
designs ultimately ended up in their competitors' hands, and the
company estimated it lost $500 million from the intrusions.39
3. Anonymous Nature of Computer Theft.-Not only is
computer trade secret theft easy and profitable most of the offenses
go undetected. The FBI estimates that as many as 95% of
computer intrusions go undetected.n The sophisticated computer
hacker simply knows how to construct his activity so that no one
detects his infiltration of the system." As one commentator
stated, computer theft is often anonymous: "Just loop your
message through a couple of different servers, including one that
makes your return address 'anonymous,' and bingo, you're in
business.42
The anonymous nature of computer theft is one of its greatest
attractions. Experts have found that the anonymity softens or even
erases the intruder's guilty feelings.4 3 A business executive may
be reluctant to break into his competitor's offices and copy their
trade secrets, but may not be so reluctant to do it in the safety of
his den. As a result, computers have created a completely new
class of criminal. Many white-collar executives have discovered,
"[i]f you want to get away with a crime today, do it using a
computer." 44
4. Difficulties in Prosecution.-Prior to the EEA's passage,
prosecution of trade secret theft was rare. This was primarily due
to the unwillingness of prosecutors to take on complex criminal
cases where an intimate knowledge of computers was a prerequis-
ite, and corporations' unwillingness to report the theft of their trade
secrets.
Prosecutors were especially unwilling to take on these cases
since the criminal statutes available to them were not well-suited
38. Schwartau, supra note 27, at 4.
39. Id.
40. Behar, supra note 21, at 59.
41. "Spoofing" and "sniffing" are almost impossible to detect. See Schwartau,
supra note 27, at 4 ("sniffing"); Young, supra note 24, at 15 ("spoofing").
42. Davis, supra note 19, at 45.
43. Young, supra note 24, at 2-3.
44. Id. at 20.
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for such crimes.45 Federal prosecutors primarily relied on the
National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),46 and the mail and wire
fraud statutes.
47
The NSPA was designed to prevent criminals from evading
state prosecution by fleeing across state lines. Prosecution under
the Act requires proof that "goods, wares or merchandise" were
transported in foreign or interstate commerce.48 Unfortunately,
some U.S. courts have held that the theft of "purely intellectual
property" does not constitute the theft of "goods, wares or
merchandise" as required by the statute.49
The chief problem with the U.S. federal mail and wire fraud
statutes-which prohibit any scheme involving the use of the mail
or wires to obtain property by false pretenses-is the need to prove
a "scheme to defraud." Since a trade secret thief often only copies
information, he does not necessarily "defraud" the company
permanently of the information. Moreover, much trade secret theft
occurs without the use of the mail or wires.5"
Probably the greatest reason why trade secret theft is not
prosecuted more often is the failure of victim companies to report
such thefts to government authorities." Companies are reluctant
to report such crimes because of concern over a loss of public trust
and public image.52
For many companies, security and control over their operations
and assets are vital to their success, and thus reporting breaches in
that security is potentially damaging to future business. As one
commentator stated, "Who wants to do business with a company
whose unstable network security is being splashed across the front
page?"53  For example, Citibank's reward for reporting the $10
million stolen from its allegedly secure computer network was
seeing its top twenty customers "wooed by rival banks, all claiming
45. House Rep., supra note 8, at 6.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1970 & Supp. 1997).
47. Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
48. United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991).
49. See id.; Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 227 (1985); see generally Halligan,
supra note 20, at B6.
50. Senate Rep., supra note 18, at 27.
51. Swartz, supra note 2, at Al.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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their computer systems were more secure."54 Companies also are
reluctant to report such thefts because they can spawn unwanted
SEC attention and shareholder derivative suits.
5. Foreign Economic Espionage.-Another reason for the
increase in trade secret theft is the changing nature of foreign
espionage. The world's nations have realized that economic
superiority now ranks in importance with military superiority. As
the legislative history to the EEA states: "Typically, espionage has
focused on military secrets. But as the cold war has drawn to a
close, this classic form of espionage has evolved. Economic
superiority is increasingly as important as military superiority. And
the espionage industry is being retooled with this in mind.
55
The statistical numbers reflect this shift. Louis Freeh, former
director of the FBI, informed Congress that the FBI was investigat-
ing reports and allegations of economic espionage conducted by
twenty-three different countries against U.S. companies.56 The list
included countries that were typically hostile to U.S. interests, but
also included long-time allies of the United States.57 The FBI also
reported that at least seven nations are training their intelligence
agents how to hack into U.S. computers for trade secrets.5" In
probably the most often cited example of foreign economic
espionage, a former director of the French secret service publicly
admitted that he directed French intelligence agents to search the
Paris hotel rooms of visiting foreign businessmen for confidential
trade secrets.59
54. Behar, supra note 21, at 64.
55. House Rep., supra note 8, at 5; see also Senate Rep., supra note 18, at 20;
Behar, supra note 21, at 64.
56. House Rep., supra note 8, at 5; Senate Rep., supra note 18, at 20; Behar,
supra note 21, at 64.
57. The list included: China, Canada, France, India and Japan. Behar, supra
note 21, at 64.
58. Id.
59. Jim Landers, Foreign Spies Target Corporate Secrets, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 7, 1996, at 1D; see Statement of Senator Cohen, supra note 12, at 377.
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III. The U.S.'s Response: Enactment of the Economic
Espionage Act
A. The EEA's Focus on Trade Secret Theft By Computer
Although the EEA was passed to criminalize all trade secret
theft and foreign economic espionage, a clear focus of the Act was
theft via the computer.6 ° As President Clinton's Statement in
support of the Act reports, the EEA was designed to "protect the
trade secrets of all businesses operating in the United States,
foreign and domestic alike, from economic espionage and trade
secret theft and deter and punish those who intrude into, damage
or steal from computer networks."61 The legislative history to the
Act further underscores the importance of computers in trade
secret thefts:
As this Nation moves into the high-technology, information age,
the value of these intangible assets will only continue to grow.
Ironically, the very conditions that make this proprietary
information so much more valuable make it easily stolen.
Computer technology enables rapid and surreptitious duplica-
tions of the information. Hundreds of pages of information can
be loaded onto a small computer diskette, placed into a coat
pocket, and taken from the legal owner.62
B. The Individual Provisions of the Economic Espionage Act
1. Trade Secret Theft - General Prohibition.-With computer
trade secret theft in mind, section 1832 of the EEA prohibits
anyone who, "with intent to convert a trade secret," "knowingly"
steals or otherwise misappropriates a trade secret for "the economic
benefit of anyone other than the owner," if the trade secret is
60. The Senate Report on the EEA states that the Act covers "a variety of
behavior-from the foreign government that uses its classic espionage apparatus to
spy on a company .... to the disgruntled former employee who walks out of his
former company with a computer diskette full of engineering schematics." Senate
Rep. supra note 18, at *8. It concludes that "[a]ll of these forms of industrial espio-
nage are troubling, and they are punished as the theft. of proprietary economic
information in this measure." Id.
61. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 3723, 142
Cong. Rec. 4034, at 4034-35 (1996).
62. House Rep., supra note 8, at 5.
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"related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed
in interstate or foreign commerce."'63 The Act expressly applies
to any individual who without authorization "copies, dupli-
cates,... photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, or conveys such information. '
Of course, the inclusion of "downloads" and "uploads" in the
statutory language unambiguously reveals the EEA's explicit focus
on unwanted computer intrusions. The Act also prohibits the more
classical manner of theft: one who "steals, or without authorization
appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice
or deception obtains such information."6 5
Like most U.S. theft statutes, the EEA also criminalizes
anyone who knowingly "receives, buys or possesses" the stolen
trade secret knowing it has been obtained without authorization:'
or who conspires with anyone to commit any of the offenses
described above.6 7 The maximum penalty for a violation of this
section is a $250,000 fine6" and imprisonment of 10 years for
individuals,69 and a $5,000,000 fine for offending organizations.7"
It is also noteworthy that the general prohibition against trade
secret theft requires the "intent to convert a trade secret."71 Thus,
a computer hacker who infiltrates a secure computer system and
destroys or tampers with a particular trade secret cannot be
prosecuted under the EEA.712  A separate U.S. federal statute
criminalizes this behavior.73
2. Foreign Economic Espionage - General Prohibition.-
Section 1831 essentially takes the conduct prohibited by section
1832 and adds a foreign component to it. Specifically, if a trade
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (1996) (the authors have restructured the language of the
provision to allow for a more simplistic and logical reading).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 1832(a)(1).
66. Id. § 1832(a)(3).
67. Id. § 1832(a)(5).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) (Supp. 1997).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996).
70. Id. § 1832(b).
71. Id. § 1832(a).
72. See James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act
of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 177, 192 (1997).
73. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)
(Supp. 1997).
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secret is stolen or misappropriated in any of the manners described
above and the offense is done with intent to, or knowing it will,
"benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent,"74 the offender may be fined $500,000 and imprisoned for
up to 15 years.75 The increased penalties that accompany a
violation of the provision indicate the importance that Congress
attaches to criminalizing foreign economic espionage.
A "foreign instrumentality" is defined to include any "associa-
tion ... or ... legal, commercial or business organization, corpora-
tion, firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled,
sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign
government., 76  Because there are still no reported decisions
under the EEA, there is little guidance on what amount of control
by a foreign government is necessary for a foreign company to be
considered a foreign instrumentality. It is safe to say, however, that
no set percentage of ownership will protect a foreign company from
coverage under the EEA if its operations or procedures are in
some manner controlled or directed by a foreign government.77
3. Protection in the Trade Secret Definition.-A great deal of
the EEA's coverage depends on the definition of a "trade secret."
The definition includes "all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering informa-
tion ... whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in
writing if- (1) the owner thereof has taken reasonable
measures to keep such information secret; and (2) the informa-
tion derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 1839(1).
77. The legislative history states:
We do not mean for the test of substantial control to be mechanistic
or mathematical. The simple fact that the majority of the stock of
a company is owned by a foreign government will not suffice under
this definition, nor for that matter will the fact that a foreign
government only owns 10 percent of a company exempt it from
scrutiny. Rather the pertinent inquiry is whether the activities of the
company are, from a practical and substantive standpoint, foreign
government directed.
142 Cong. Rec. S10882, at S10885 (Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
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from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, the public."78
Congress in the EEA instructed the courts to read this definition
broadly.79
a. "Reasonable Measures."--The requirement that
"reasonable measures" be implemented before certain information
qualifies as a "trade secret" under the EEA places a considerable
onus upon the owner of the trade secret. Since there have not yet
been any reported decisions under the EEA, what qualifies as
"reasonable measures" is somewhat elusive. However, the
legislative history does give some guidance. The drafters did not
wish "to impose any requirements on companies or owners.5
80
Rather, "[e]ach owner must assess the value of the material it seeks
to protect, the extent- of a threat of theft, and the ease of theft in
determining how extensive their protective measures should be."81
The drafters further opine that "what constitutes reasonable
measures in one particular field of knowledge or industry may vary
significantly from what is reasonable in another field or indus-
try. , 8
2
At minimum, the drafters suggest that only those who need
access to the trade secret should be granted access and that the
owner indicate in some way that he considers the information
confidential and proprietary.83 No "heroic or extreme measures"
are necessary.8'
b. "Independent Economic Value. "--The second prong
of the "trade secret" definition is also noteworthy because it only
mandates that the information have "independent" economic value
by its status of not being generally known to the public at large.
In contrast, the definition of a "trade secret" under the Uniform
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
79. Chaim A. Levin, Trade-Secret Thieves Face Fines, Prosecution, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 27, 1997, at C12, C13; House Rep., supra note 8, at 12.
80. 142 Cong. Rec. S12201-03, at S12212, S12213 (Oct. 2, 1996) (managers'
statement) [hereinafter "Managers' Statement"].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Trade Secrets Act8 -the definition on which the EEA's definition
is based-requires proof of "independent economic value," and that
the stolen information has economic value to the individual who
misappropriated it.86 The EEA definition is an easier standard to
satisfy since it eliminates the need to establish the accused's
subjective state of mind with respect to the information's value.
c. General Knowledge Is Not Covered. -The trade secret
definition holds considerable significance for those individuals who
fear they may be prosecuted under the EEA for merely applying
the general knowledge they acquired in a previous position to their
latest job. There was considerable debate on this matter during the
drafting of the EEA and it was the drafters' intention that any ill-
advised prosecution of such individuals be foreclosed.87 As the
legislative history states, employees "who change employers or start
their own companies should be able to apply their talents without
fear of prosecution."88
By requiring the owner of a trade secret to take proactive,
"reasonable measures" to protect information that it deems a
"trade secret," nomad employees gain a valuable affirmative
defense to any attempted prosecution under the EEA. The EEA
affirmatively places the burden on the procecutor to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that it took the appropriate "reasonable
measures" and that the employee is not merely applying their
85. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1990). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which creates a separate, civil cause of action for trade secret theft, has been
adopted, in whole or in part, by 42 states. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr (Supp.
1996).
86. Id. § 1(4)(i) (requiring those who misappropriate the information to be
able to "obtain economic value from its disclosure or use" in order for it to qualify
as a trade secret).
87. Managers' Statement, supra note 80, at S12213.
88. Id. In the Manager's statement supporting the EEA, a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision is quoted to emphasize this concern:
It is not a phenomenal thing in American business life to see an
employee, after a long period of service, leave his employment and start
a business of his own or in association with others. And it is inevitable
in such a situation, where the former employee has dealt with customers
on a personal basis that some of those customers will want to continue
to deal with him in that new association. This is ... natural, logical and
a part of human fellowship ....
Id. The Manager then concludes that "[t]his legislation does not criminalize or in
any way hamper these natural incidents of employment." Id.
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general knowledge obtained during their previous employment with
the claimed owner of the trade secret.
The fact that the EEA requires some identifiable piece of
information to be stolen also provides employees who frequently
change employers some protection from prosecution. As the
legislative history states, "[i]t is not enough to say that a person has
accumulated experience and knowledge during the course of his or
her employ" and that the individual is inappropriately using such
knowledge.8 9  Unlike the "reasonable measures" provision,
however, the protection granted the employee will depend upon the
employee proving that the product being challenged was the result
of accumulated experience and knowledge, rather than the theft of
a trade secret. This is because the owner will likely be able to
show some link between the employee's past work and the trade
secret allegedly stolen, thereby shifting the burden to the defendant
employee.
d. The "Product" Requirement.-Although the definition
of a trade secret under the EEA is intentionally broad, it is actually
narrow in one important respect. In order for a trade secret to be
protected under the EEA, it must be "related to or included in a
product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce." 90 In limiting the EEA's application to products sold
in commerce, the drafters of the statute appear to have excluded
the possibility of prosecuting an individual for misappropriation of
trade secrets that are related to services, or information discovered,
but not used by a company, both of which qualify as trade secrets
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.9"
e. "Reverse Engineering" and "Parallel Development"
Are Not Prohibited.-Two valid defenses to an alleged violation of
the EEA are that the information was obtained through "reverse
engineering" or "parallel development." Neither are prohibited by
the EEA.92 "Reverse engineering" involves the taking apart and
subsequent reconstruction of the product to determine how it was
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a).
91. Pooley, supra note 72, at 200.
92. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Violations of Intellectual
Property Rights, May 1997, at 80-81.
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made or what components were used.93 "Parallel development"
involves the discovery or creation of an alleged trade secret
through one's own research and hard work. The owner of a trade
secret does not have an absolute monopoly on the information or
data that comprises the trade secret.94
3. Confidentiality.-One of the chief deterrents to companies
bringing civil suits against individuals who have stolen a trade
secret has historically been the increased exposure such a lawsuit
brings to the trade secret. More specifically, by bringing the
lawsuit, the company highlights the trade secret for the broader
public, including its competitor who may be a named defendant,
and thus often does more damage than good.
To combat this problem, the EEA includes a provision
instructing the court to "enter such orders and take such other
action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the
confidentiality of trade secrets" consistent with the applicable
federal rules of procedure.9" The legislative history further
instructs that when considering the matter, the court should "always
assume that the material at issue is in fact a trade secret., 96 This
provision does not necessarily give the court any power that it did
not already have, but it certainly makes the court more cognizant
of the issue.
4. Victim Compensation.-Although the EEA is a federal
criminal statute, one of Congress' concerns in passage was ensuring
that victims of trade secret theft receive adequate compensation for
their losses. There are two ways (outside a civil proceeding) that
a victim can obtain compensation for losses incurred through the
theft of a trade secret: 1) forfeiture; and 2) restitution.
a. Forfeiture.-Section 1834 of the EEA expressly
provides for forfeiture of both the proceeds and assets used to
facilitate a violation of the EEA. Specifically, it states that any
person who violates the EEA shall forfeit 1) "any property
93. Pooley, supra note 72, at 195.
94. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Violations of Intellectual
Property Rights, May 1997, at 80.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1835.
96. Managers' Statement, supra note 80, at S12213; see also 142 Cong. Rec.
S10882, at S10886 (Sept. 18, 1996).
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constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;" and 2) "any
of the person's property used, or intended to be used ... to
commit or facilitate the commission of such violation. ,97  This
includes any profit the individual or company obtained from use of
the trade secret and any computer hardware and other instrumenta-
tion that a person might use to intrude into a secure system.
Whether to award forfeiture is subject to the court's discretion,
"taking into consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of
the use of the property in the offense.""8  All fines are for the
benefit of the government."
After identifying the property that can be forfeited, the EEA
expressly incorporates the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,
the existing federal law on distribution of forfeited property.100
Under this law, any party who believes they have an interest in the
forfeited property may petition, the court "for a hearing to
adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest." 101  The party's
petition must set forth the bases for their claim to the forfeited
property and be signed under penalty of perjury."0 2 At the
hearing, the petitioning party may testify, present evidence and
witnesses, and cross examine all witnesses who appear,103 and
must prove their "right, title or interest" in the property by a
preponderance of the evidence.1" Victims are afforded priority
in forfeiture proceedings due to the U.S. Department of Justice's
policy of providing restitution to crime victims.' Fines are
exclusively paid to the federal government.10 6
b. Restitution.-In addition to the EEA's forfeiture
provisions, victims may also seek restitution under the Victim and
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a).
98. Id.
99. The Threat of Foreign Economic Espionage to U.S. Corporations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law, 102nd Cong., 245
(1992).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1834(p).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (Supp. 1997).
102. Id. § 853(n)(3).
103. Id. § 853(n)(5).
104. Id. § 853(n)(6).
105. Managers' Statement, supra note 80, at S12213.
106. Id.
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Witness Protection Act that was passed by Congress in 1982.1"7
This law generally compels the federal judge who is sentencing a
criminal defendant to consider the effect and impact of the
defendant's crime on the victim. 8 Restitution is proper for all
federal criminal offenses. Thus, if an individual or entity is the
victim of trade secret theft, and the federal authorities convict the
defendant, the victims may be entitled to restitution.10 9
Restitution may not be ordered, however, if the court
"determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of
restitution outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims
.... ,110 Consequently, an order of restitution is by no means a
sure thing for the victims.'
If properly implemented, the forfeiture and restitution
provisions can make victims of trade secret theft whole, thereby
eliminating the need for an injured party to bring a civil action.11 2
This would save the injured party significant court and attorneys'
fees, and minimize the potential for further exposure of the stolen
trade secret. Nonetheless, a prudent victim should consider filing
a civil action to protect their claim and forestall any attempt by the
defendant or other interested party to argue that the trade secret
was either abandoned or has somehow become general knowledge.
In other words, it is a good idea for victimized companies to get
107. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-
1515, 3146(a), 3579, 3580 (1982)).
108. See Lawrence P. Fletcher, Note, Restitution in the Criminal Process:
Procedures for Fixing the Offender's Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 505, 509 n.18 (1984).
109. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (1994). "The restitution provisions are intended
to aid crime victims by requiring convicted defendants to compensate their victims
to the greatest extent possible, thus achieving the 'ultimate justice."' Lorraine
Slavin and David J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution
Provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
507, 508 (1984) (citing 128 Cong. Rep. H8207 & H8209 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982)
(remarks of Rep. Fish and Rep. McCollum)).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (1985 & Supp. 1997).
111. See generally George J. Moscarino & Michael R. Shumaker, Beating the
Shell Game: Bank Secrecy Laws and Their Impact on Civil Recovery in Interna-
tional Fraud Action, 1 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 42, 45 (1997) (discussing
problems raised by qualification).
112. Some companies may be hesitant to make forfeiture or restitution claims
because they invite unwanted scrutiny of company operations and their trade
secrets.
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their foot in the courthouse door so that they can preserve their
rights and options.
6. Civil Proceedings to Enjoin Violations.-In an effort to
provide protection for victims as soon as trade secret theft is
discovered, the EEA authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to bring
a civil action to "obtain appropriate injunctive relief against any
violation" of the EEA.113 No criminal indictment need be on file
at the time."4 This provision allows the government to enjoin a
victim from using the trade secret to his advantage while an
investigation or prosecution takes place.
C. Application of the EEA to International Conduct
The territorial reach of the EEA is intentionally broad and
includes a provision that explicitly addresses "conduct outside the
U.S." ' 5 This provision rebuts "the general presumption against
the extraterritoriality of U.S. criminal laws" and makes "it clear
that the Act is meant to apply to the specified conduct occurring
beyond U.S. borders."" 6 It is designed to provide the Justice
Department "with broad authority to prosecute international theft
and will prevent willful evasion of liability for trade secret misap-
propriation by using the Internet or other means to transfer the
trade secret information outside the country.""117
The EEA contains a number of jurisdictional hooks to
accomplish this goal. The EEA applies to "conduct occurring
outside the United States" if 1) the offender is a citizen or
permanent resident alien of the United States; 2) the offender is an
organization organized under the laws of the United States or any
state or political subdivision of the United States; or 3) "an act in
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States.'
118
The first two standards are easy to apply, but the third will
likely engender diverging opinions of the proper jurisdictional
scope of the EEA. To illustrate, suppose a computer hacker in
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1836.
114. Halligan, supra note 20, at B6.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
116. House Rep., supra note 8, at 14.
117. Halligan, supra note 20, at B6.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
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France uses IBM's computer network in New York to break into
a company's system in Canada. Was an "act in furtherance of the
offence" committed in the United States such that jurisdiction
exists?
This jurisdictional puzzle is particularly perplexing given the
manner in which the Internet works. The Internet is not one
computer "superhighway" as some mistakenly believe; there is no
centralized storage location for information, no central control
point, and no singular communications channel."9 Rather, the
Internet is hundreds of thousands of computer networks linked
together. For example, if someone sends an e-mail message from
London to Madrid, that message may pass from London to Madrid
via a Paris computer network on one occasion, and from London
to Madrid via a New York computer network on another. Suppose
someone in France uses the Internet to steal the trade secret of a
Canadian company and the Internet-unbeknownst to the
thief-uses a computer network in the United States to complete
the computer-instructed request. Was an act committed in the
United States such that jurisdiction exists?
These scenarios raise interesting questions, illustrate the
potential breadth of the EEA, and portend significant jurisdictional
battles under the EEA. Nonetheless, two instructive points can be
safely made. First, the greater the value of the trade secret stolen
or harm to the U.S.'s interests, the more likely a court will allow a
prosecutor to stretch the court's jurisdictional arm in order to
prosecute a foreign thief. Even the most zealous prosecutor will
not attempt a risky prosecution if the injury or harm is relatively
ordinary. Second, it is unlikely that a prosecutor will attempt to
assert jurisdiction over conduct that is only marginally connected
to the United States at this point in the EEA's young life. The
Attorney General has promised Congress that it will clear all
prosecutions under the EEA at the highest levels of the Justice
Department 20 and will report back to Congress on the results in
119. See William A. Hodkowski, Comment, The Future of Internet Security:
How New Technologies Will Shape the Internet and Affect the Law, 13 COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L. J. 217, 222 (1997).
120. Statement of Senator Kohl, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1997, at 4. An
earlier version of the EEA required the Attorney General to authorize all
prosecutions under the EEA. This provision was subsequently deleted when
Attorney General Janet Reno promised Congress that the Department of Justice
would promulgate regulations to the same effect. Jonathan Band & William
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two years. 1' Thus, it is a safe bet that the U.S. Attorney Gener-
al's office will select only those cases that they are sure to win or
at a minimum sure to gain favorable precedent.'22
III. Conclusion
Without question, the commission of sophisticated electronic
crimes has been greatly facilitated by global technology and
computerized information systems. The detection and ultimate
prosecution of such crimes have similarly changed. Criminal and
civil trials worldwide increasingly feature the use of electronic
media to produce both live and graphic evidence to assist courts
and juries to understand the often complex evidence of fraud.
Computer e-mail messages, the interception of cellular telephone
communications, and pager records are also valuable, accessible
evidence of incriminating conversations and communications that
were unavailable only a few years ago.
The passage of the Economic Espionage Act marks a signifi-
cant milestone in the prosecution of global economic crime. U.S.
and foreign citizens, as well as foreign governments, who attempt
to steal their way into unearned profits now face substantial
monetary penalties and jail time. The use of the EEA will also
greatly increase the likelihood that victims will obtain just compen-
sation for their injuries and will further allow courts to insure the
confidentiality of U.S. companies' most valuable economic assets,
their private and valuable trade secrets. Finally, the international
cyber-criminal who specializes in surreptitious computer theft can
no longer feel secure that his conduct will go undetected or that he
can escape liability because he is not a U.S. citizen or not physically
located in the United States.
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